Intra-household work time synchronization by Chris van Klaveren & Henriette Maassen van den Brink
Abstract If partners derive utility from joint leisure time, it is expected that they
will coordinate their work schedules in order to increase the amount of joint leisure.
In order to control for differences in constraints and selection effects, this paper uses
a new matching procedure, providing answers to the following questions: (1) Do
partners coordinate their work schedules and does this result in work time syn-
chronization?; (2) which partners synchronize more work hours?; and (3) is there a
preference for togetherness? We find that coordination results in more synchronized
work hours. The presence of children in the household is the main cause why some
partners synchronize their work times less than other partners. Finally, partners
coordinate their work schedules in order to have more joint leisure time, which is
evidence for togetherness preferences.
Keywords Time allocation Æ Leisure time Æ Togetherness Æ Work hours Æ
Household Æ Family and work
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1 Introduction
The benefits of marriage that are usually stressed by economic theory are the
possibility of joint consumption of household goods and the gains of division of
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labor. It is, however, likely that individuals do not only derive utility from marriage
because of these material benefits alone. They might also derive utility from
spending leisure time together. If this is the case, it can be hypothesized that it pays
off for married or co-habiting individuals to synchronize their work hours, assuming
that individuals within a household can coordinate their work schedules. This paper
contributes to the existing models of time allocation by considering synchronization
of work times instead of the work time quantities and by examining couples pref-
erences for togetherness.
In traditional time allocation models individuals maximize their utility by
choosing an optimal time allocation scheme given a budget and a time constraint.1
These models focuss on choosing the optimal quantities of market work, household
work and leisure time. If couples derive utility from spending leisure time together
then it is important not only to consider the time quantities, but also the timing of
certain activities. In other words, the amount of market work and timing of market
work are interdependent. This makes the utility maximization problem more diffi-
cult and also influences labor supply decisions.
There is empirical evidence that parents prefer to spend joint leisure time with
there children (see Hallberg & Klevmarken, 2003). When parents synchronize their
work times better, they are able to spend more joint leisure time with their children
as a family. On the other hand, having young children influences the degree of work
time synchronization negatively (see Hallberg 2003; Hamermesh, 2000; Van Velzen,
2001). Since paid child care is expensive it pays off for parents to de-synchronize
their work times, because by caring themselves the cost of child care are reduced.
Suppose that each parent first chooses a fixed amount of work hours and then
chooses a work time schedule. Making paid child care more available at a lower
price might result in less de-synchronized work times, resulting in more joint leisure
time while labor supply remains constant.
Although many papers examine what influences the amount of work hours that
individuals work on the market, relatively few papers consider the timing of market
work hours. Furthermore, there are relatively few papers that simulate a control
group in order to control for differences in constraints between households and
selection effects such that solely the coordination effect on work timing is examined.
Hamermesh (1996, 2000) was among the first who paid attention to the extent to
which couples synchronize their work times. In Hamermesh (2000) each non-single
male is replaced with a randomly selected non-single male and each non-single
female with a randomly selected non-single female thereby generating random
couples. Comparing the work time overlap2 between the real couples and the gen-
erated random couples he finds that the real couples synchronize their work hours to
allow for joint leisure more than the generated random couples.
Jenkins and Osberg (2005) and Hallberg (2003) test if partners coordinate their
work schedules and as a result synchronize their work times. Jenkins and Osberg
replace each non-single male with a single male with similar characteristics
and each non-single female with a single female with similar characteristics.3
1 See for example Becker (1965), Gronau (1986) and Chiappori (1988).
2 Work time overlap is defined as the number of hours that both partners spend on paid work at the
same time during the day.
3 Jenkins and Osberg (2005) also match every husband with every wife and find that the average
work time synchronization of the real couples is about 5% larger than that of the pseudo couples.
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Comparing the work time overlap of the matched singles with the real couples
they find that real couples have about 5 percent more work time overlap. Hallberg
(2003) matches a single male and a single female into a pseudo couple and then
matches this pseudo couple to a real couple conditioned on certain personal
characteristics following a matching algorithm of Rubin (1979) which uses maha-
lanobis distances. A matched single can be regarded as the nearest neighbor of the
non-single given the singles sample. Comparing the work timing of the pseudo-
couples with the real-couples, Hallberg (2003) finds evidence of coordination on
synchronous work times and finds that market work and leisure timing are intra-
household dependent.
It can be questioned however, if constraints imposed by society are indeed
the same for singles and couples. If singles face different constraints imposed by
society then it might be that the observed difference of work time overlap is
due to differences in constraints. For example, living expenses are relatively
higher for singles. Furthermore, singles do not have the possibility to gain from
division of labor or have other benefits from living together. Another point that
can be made is that singles with (young) children are a rather specific group.
Their time allocation choices are likely to be different compared non-single
individuals.
It can be argued that there is a selection problem. Individuals who have more
synchronized work times (and therefore more synchronized leisure time) have a
higher probability of meeting each other. In this case, finding a significant higher
work time overlap might be the consequence of a selection effect. It is also possible
that singles synchronize work time with other singles. If they are in search for a
partner they synchronize their time with other singles in the same social group. Non-
singles already have a partner and therefore might not synchronize their work times
to the same extent. Finding a significant lower work time overlap might then also be
the consequence of a selection effect.
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we test if there is work time syn-
chronization by using a matching strategy where couples are first matched to other
couples and then switch partners. The couples that remain after the partner-switch
are referred to as pseudo couples. Comparing the work time overlap between the
real couples and the pseudo couples reveals whether partners coordinate their work
schedules and whether coordination results in more synchronized work hours.
Furthermore, we examine why some couples are better in coordinating their work
times compared to other couples.
Second, we examine if there is a preference for togetherness. Partners who
coordinate their work schedules have more potential joint leisure time. Better
coordination of work schedules and preference for togetherness should then result in
more joint leisure time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical time allocation
model. Section 3 describes the data that are used. Section 4 proposes a matching
strategy where couples are matched to other couples. Section 5 examines, first, if
there is a synchronization effect, which can be attributed to active coordination of
couples. This section also examines why some couples synchronize their work times
more than other couples do. Section 6 studies if there is a preference for together-
ness. Finally Sect. 7 concludes.
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2 Time allocation model
Consider a two-person household where individuals within the household allocate
their time to market work or to leisure time.4 A time period T is defined, which can
be a day or a week, and it is assumed that this time period is divided in equal time
units t. For simplicity T can be defined as one day, and one time unit can be defined
as one hour.
If both individuals within the household allocate their tth hour to leisure then this
tth hour is considered as joint leisure time. All other allocation choices of both
individuals will not result in joint leisure time. The possible leisure timing allocation
schemes for all units t is then represented as:
Lm ¼ Lm½lm1  ð1  lf1Þ; . . . ; lmT  ð1  lfTÞ
Lf ¼ Lf ½lf1  ð1  lm1 Þ; . . . ; lfT  ð1  lmT Þ
Lj ¼ Lf ½lm1  lf1; . . . ; lmT  lfT 
ð1Þ
where lt
s indicates one if individual s consumes leisure at the tth hour and zero
otherwise, for s = m(ales), f(emales). Note that Ls is leisure time that is spent alone.
The maximization problem of the household can now be described as:
U ¼ UðLm; Lf ; Lj; CÞ ð2Þ




wmt  ð1  lmt Þ þ
XT
t¼1
wft  ð1  lft Þ ð3Þ
Where C is consumption and wst is the wage rate of individual s of hour t. Wage rates
are assumed to be exogenous and may vary over time. Partners maximize the
household utility function subject to Eq. 3.
Individuals will choose paid work at hour t if the market wage is higher than the
reservation wage for that particular hour. However, the reservation wage is not only
determined by preferences to consume market goods but also by preferences to
spend leisure time together. The first component has to do with the quantity of
leisure time, while the second component has to do with the timing of market work.
Furthermore, the model shows that the optimal amount of joint leisure time is
influenced by the timing strategy of both partners and also by the time and budget
constraints.
3 General data information
In November 2001, a Dutch survey was held named the ’The Condition of the
Country’. This survey was the initiative of the Research Institute SCHOLAR of the
University of Amsterdam (Schooling, Labor Market and Economic Development)
4 This section is largely based on Hamermesh (2000).
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and conducted by the Netherlands Press Association, a coordinating institute for
regional newspapers. The total number of subscriptions is about 1.7 million, equally
spread over the Netherlands. The questionnaire contains information on market
work, household work, and child care for both partners simultaneously. Moreover,
there is information about the financial situation, health, education, training, career
and social environment. Finally, there is a wide spectrum of attitude questions with
respect to work, political and life events and measures of individual well being. We
have data on 3,074 couples.
The following work timing question was posed to respondents and their partner if
they had one:
‘‘At what time do you normally start (end) working?’’
Respondents could answer this question accurately to the minute. Using this work





ðjobmt  jobft Þ ð4Þ




Where O represents the work time overlap variable and jobt
s represents if, respec-
tively, the male or female works on the market at time t. For reasons of simplicity we
converted this variable into one that is measured in hours with a precision of
2 decimals.
4 Matching procedure and descriptive statistics
In this section we propose a matching strategy where each (real) couple is first
matched to another couple from the sample based on certain characteristics. The
matched couples are referred to as simulated real couples (SRC). Then couples
switch partners and the couples that remain after the partner switch are referred
to as pseudo couples. Comparing the work time overlap between the real couples
and the pseudo couples gives information on whether partners coordinate their
work schedules and whether coordination result in more synchronized work
hours.
This matching method has advantages over the matching methods used in Jenkins
and Osberg (2005) and Hallberg (2003). First the selection effect is less of a problem,
since the partners of the real couples and matched couples are married or living
together and have the same amount of work time overlap. Furthermore, the con-
straints imposed by society are similar for couples and matched couples when the
individuals of the couple and matched couple have about the same personal char-
acteristics.
Consider a couple where the individuals of the couple are denoted by Mi and Fi.
Conditioned on personal characteristics couple {Mi;Fi} is matched to another couple
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{Mj;Fj}, which we will refer to as simulated real couple (SRC).
5 Then both couples
switch partners so that we have two new couples, {Mj;Fi} and {Mi;Fj}, which we will
refer to as pseudo couples (PC1 and PC2).
All four couples face the same constraints imposed by society but there is coor-
dination between the individuals of the real couple and the simulated real couple
while there is no coordination between the individuals of the pseudo couples. In
order to test the work time synchronization hypotheses we do the following:
1. Compare the timing of market work {Mi;Fi} and {Mj;Fj} and find no significant
difference in the timing of market work.
2. Compare the timing of market work of, respectively, {Mi;Fi} and {Mj;Fj} with the
possible pseudo couples, i.e. {Mi;Fj} and {Mj;Fi} and find a significant difference
in the timing of market work.
Comparing the timing of market work between {Mi;Fi} And {Mj;Fj} gives more
information regarding the quality of the match. Finding a significant difference in
the timing of market work between, respectively, {Mi;Fi} and {Mj;Fj} with both
pseudo couples is then empirical support for work time overlap between the
individuals of a household due to coordination (a more elaborate explanation is
given in Appendix).
When households are matched to other households this happens on the basis of an
identification number. First each household receives an identification number based
on characteristics of the household members. The following personal characteristics
are used as matching variables:
1. Education level in three categories (low, middle and high).
2. Age in three categories (18–35; 35–50 and 50–65).
3. Having children who are living at homes (dummy)
4. The number of individuals living in the respondents community measured on a
five point scale (<5,000; 5,000–20,000; 20,000–50,000; 50,000–100,000; >100,000).
5. Work hours in 22 categories, so that each couple should work approximately the
same amount of hours on the market (we defined >21 h as one category).
Exact matching of couples based on these personal characteristics gives 449
unique groups containing information of 1,772 couples. It is possible that some
groups contain more than two couples since there is more than one exact match
for a certain couple. In this case a couple is randomly drawn from that group
with equal probability given that the couple that is drawn is not the real couple
itself.
The descriptive statistics of the real couples and the simulated real couples are
shown in Table 1. The simulated real couples have about similar descriptive
statistics compared to the real couples. The differences in means in Table 1
between the simulated real couples and the real couples are not significant.
Although a child-dummy variable was used to match couples, Table 1 shows that
the number of children between certain age levels are very similar. The
individuals of the real couples and the simulated real couples have about the
same personal characteristics and hence the constraints imposed by society is
considered to be the same for these couples.
5 It must hold that j „ i.
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5 Empirical results
5.1 Do partners coordinate their work schedules?
Before comparing the work time overlap between the real couples and the pseudo
couples we should compare the work time overlap of the real couples with that of the
simulated real couples. A t-test which compares the work time overlap of both real
couples can be regarded as a simulation quality test. If the descriptive statistics are
very similar but the difference in work time overlap turns out to be significantly
different from zero, this indicates that the simulated real couples are not ‘good
quality’ look alikes. Table 2 indicates that real couples and simulated couples have
on average the same amount of work time overlap, which indicates that the simu-
lated real couples are good quality look alikes.
Tables 3 and 4 show the t-test results where the mean work time overlap of the
real couples and simulated real couples is compared to that of the pseudo couples
(PC1 and PC2). Both tables indicate that the pseudo couples have significantly less
work time overlap compared to the real couples and simulated real couples. The
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the one-to-one matched couples
Real couples SRC
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Age of male 1,758 43.412 9.607 1,758 43.462 9.601
Education level male 1,758 6.047 1.810 1,758 6.065 1.805
No. of children between 0 and 4 1,758 .157 .798 1,758 .144 .750
No. of children between 4 and 12 1,758 .378 1.310 1,758 .374 1.250
No. of children between 12 and 18 1,758 .376 1.925 1,758 .351 1.795
Work hours male 1,758 8.929 .646 1,758 8.923 .647
Living area male 1,758 2.078 .814 1,758 2.078 .814
Age of female 1,758 42.258 9.629 1,758 42.230 9.592
Education level female 1,758 5.660 1.885 1,758 5.642 1.880
No. of children between 0 and 4 1,758 .157 .798 1,758 .144 .750
No. of children between 4 and 12 1,758 .378 1.310 1,758 .374 1.250
No. of children between 12 and 18 1,758 .376 1.925 1,758 .351 1.795
Work hours female 1,758 7.855 1.757 1,758 7.850 1.756
Living area female 1,758 2.078 .814 1,758 2.078 .814
Table 2 T-test overlap difference—matching real couples with simulated real couples
Real couples Simulated real couples Difference
Mean 7.375 7.393 –.017
SE of mean .047 .047 .036
SD of mean 1.997 1.970 1.529
Number of observations 1,772 1,772 1,772
Note: * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
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difference in work time overlap averaged 0.092 h over all matches, which is about
5.5 min each day.6
The significant higher work time overlap for the real couples and simulated real
couples compared to the pseudo couples can be regarded as the result of work time
synchronization due to coordination. Our findings are in line with the findings of Jenkins
and Osberg (2005) and Hallberg (2003), although the synchronization effect is smaller.
5.2 Which partners synchronize more work hours?
Although we find that partners on average coordinate their work time it is possible
that partners of certain ‘types’ of households will coordinate their work schedules
differently compared to other ‘types’ of households. It is, for example, possible that
partners coordinate their work schedules such that their work hours are de-syn-
chronized. Consider a couple with a young child and suppose that this couple tries to
maximize the amount of hours that their child spend with at least one of the parents.
In this case coordinating work schedules can result in de-synchronization behavior of
work times. So instead of performing a t-test for the whole sample, it is informative
to perform a t-test for sub-groups.
Table 5 shows the t-test results for sub-groups which can be seen as dif-in-dif
estimation results. The first column indicates the characteristic on which the t-test is
Table 3 Test if mean work time overlap between the real couples and the psuedo couples is
different
Compare overlap variable with PC1 Compare overlap variable with PC2
Real couples PC1 Difference Real couples PC2 Difference
Mean 7.375 7.286 .089 7.375 7.299 .076
SE of mean .047 .047 .018*** .047 .046 .032**
SD of mean 1.997 1.967 .763 1.997 1.936 1.355
Number of
observations
1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772
Note: * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
Table 4 Test if mean work time overlap between the simulated real couples and the pseudo couples
is different







Mean 7.393 7.286 .107 7.393 7.299 .093
SE of mean .047 .047 .033*** .047 .046 .018***
SD of mean 1.970 1.967 1.373 1.970 1.936 .768
Number of observations 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772
Note: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level
6 In order to see if this result is robust we repeatedly performed the simulation method and found
that this result is stable.
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based, like for example if there are children present in the household between 0 and
4. We refer to this group as treatment group for notational convenience. The non-
treated are then those households where there are no children present between 0
and 4 and the treated are those households where there are children present between
0 and 4. For both the treated and the non-treated we can perform a t-test that
compares how much the work time overlap differs compared to the control group.
Note, that in this section we refer to a control group, treated households and non-
treated households, which can be confusing. The control group for each household is
defined as the average work time overlap of both Pseudo Couples. The treated
households are those households that have a certain characteristic. Given a certain
treatment, it holds that we can still refer to a control group for both the treated and
non-treated.
The information given in Table 5 is twofold. First, it shows if households that have
the opportunity to coordinate their work schedules, synchronize their work hours
better compared to households that do not have the opportunity to coordinate their
work schedules. Second, it shows if certain households coordinate their work
schedules better than others given certain characteristics.
Table 5 shows that couples without children coordinate their work schedules
which results in more work time overlap compared to the control group. For couples
with children this is not found. These findings are in line with research by Hamer-
mesh (2000), Hallberg (2003) and Van Velzen (2001). However, although we do find
that children negatively influences the degree of work time synchronization, we find
no empirical evidence that couples with children coordinate their work schedules
such that their work hours are de-synchronized.
Partners in all education levels coordinate their work schedules resulting in more
work time overlap. The level of education does not seem to influence the extent to
which this happens.
Table 5 T-tests using treatment groups
Treatment Non-treated Treated
No. of obs. DNT No. of obs. DT
Children between 0 and 4 1,601 .084*** 171 .066
Children between 4 and 12 1,423 .095*** 349 .033
Children between 12 and 18 1,473 .093*** 299 .030
Education male low 1,489 .078*** 283 .111*
Education male med. 1,289 .085*** 483 .075*
Education male high 766 .088** 1006 .078***
Education female low 1,395 .082*** 377 .083**
Education female med. 1,189 .083*** 583 .082**
Education female high 960 .082*** 812 .083***
Age male < 35 1,334 .069** 438 .125***
35 < Age male < 50 902 .098*** 870 .066**
50 < Age male < 65 1,308 .086*** 464 .072*
Age female < 35 1,293 .067** 479 .124***
35 < Age female < 50 883 .100*** 889 .066**
50 < Age female < 65 1,368 .086*** 404 .071*
Household income low 1,195 .101*** 577 .044
Household income med. 1,194 .100*** 578 .047
Household income high 1,155 .045* 617 .153***
Note: * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
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Partners in all age groups tend to synchronize their work hours, but the effect is
strongest for households where one of the two partners is, or both partners are, younger
than 35. This is surprising since these types of household are most likely to have young
children present in the household. One can reason that young individuals at the
beginning of their careers are looking for a job that best suits them and are therefore
possible job hoppers. In this choice process they might also include the timing of work.
Household income matters, but only for those households who are in the highest
income category. Partners with a high household income coordinate their work
schedules and have three times as much work time overlap compared to partners
who have a low or medium household income. High income households can afford
more hours of (in)formal child care than low income households leading to more
synchronized work schedules.
In general Table 5 indicates that the possibility of coordination will result in more
work time overlap. The absence of children and being in the highest income category
seems to be the main cause of why some partners synchronize their work times
substantially more compared to others.
6 Is their a preference for togetherness?
Although the estimation results suggest that partners coordinate their work sched-
ules, this does not imply that they have a preference for togetherness. It is still
possible that the small amount of time that is synchronized is not spent with the
partner, but is spent on activities without the partner. In order to see if there is a
preference for togetherness we examine if coordination of work schedules influences
the amount of time that partners are together.
First, we will estimate the following equation by mean of OLS:
Orc ¼ a0 þ a1  Opc1 þ a2  Opc2 þ  ð6Þ
where O stands for work time overlap of, respectively, the real couple and the two
pseudo couples. The difference between the real couple and the pseudo couples is
that the partners of the real couples can coordinate their work schedules. Therefore
the variation in Orc caused by coordination of work schedules is captured by . We
then obtain  and estimate the following equation using OLS:
tp ¼ b0 þ
XJ
j¼1
bj  Xj þ bJþ1  ^ þ l ð7Þ
The left hand side variable is the number of hours that partners spend with each
other during an average day. This variable is regressed on certain personal or
households characteristics and the ^ term. The characteristics that are used are age,
education level, having children between certain age levels, making use of child care
and how satisfied the respondent is with the relationship.7 The satisfaction level with
the relationship is a subjective measure where respondents are asked to report how
satisfied they are with their relationship on a one to ten scale. The estimation results
are shown in Table 6.
7 Unfortunately there was no information for both partners.
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Unfortunately, there is a drop in the number of observations. This is caused by the
fact that many partners did not answer the question how many hours they spend with
their partner on a normal day in the week.
The children effect and the effect of the education level of the female and the
effect of satisfaction level with the partner are not surprising. The presence of
children has a negative influence on the joint leisure time of parents which is also
found by Hamermesh (2000), Hallberg (2003) and Van Velzen (2001). Higher
educated females tend to work more job hours and this constrains the number of
hours that both partners can spend together. Partners that are more satisfied with
their relationship derive more utility from spending time together and hence these
partners spend more time together than partners who are less satisfied.
The ^ term is also significant and has a coefficient of .198. This means that if
partners coordinate their work schedules and as a consequence synchronize their
work times one hour more, this will result in 0.198 h more joint leisure time. This
empirical result can be seen as evidence for the preference of togetherness.
7 Conclusion
If couples derive utility from spending leisure time together, it is expected that these
couples will coordinate their work schedules in order to increase the amount of joint
leisure time.
Hamermesh (2000), Jenkins and Osberg (2005) and Hallberg (2003) find empir-
ical evidence that couples synchronize leisure by adjusting their working schedules,
timing of household work and leisure. They adopt a simulation method where singles
are matched to non-singles and assume that the constraints imposed by society are
similar for singles and non-singles.
It is likely that singles face different constraints than non-singles do. As economic
theory suggests, there are economies of scale to marriage or to living together.
Furthermore, if singles are matched to non-singles then the significant higher work
time overlap might be the consequence of a selection effect. Hence, it is not possible




ln agemale –.739 –.920
ln agefemale .233 .300
ln edumale –.518 –3.530
ln edufemale .105 .710
No children present .371 2.810
Child present between 0 and 4 –.014 –.170
Child present between 4 and 12 –.048 –.940
Child present between 12 and 18 –.013 –.500
Making use of child care –.521 –2.720




No. of obs. 982
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constraint imposed by society, due to a selection effect or is the consequence of
coordination of work schedules.
This paper answers three questions: First, do partners coordinate their work
schedules leading to increased synchronization? Second, which partners synchronize
more work hours? Finally, is there a preference for togetherness?
We propose a matching strategy where couples are first matched to other couples
and then switch partners. Then we compare the work time overlap of the two couples
before the partner switch with the work time overlap of the two couples after the
partner switch. In this case the selection effect diminishes since both real couples are
married or living together and have the same amount of work hours overlap. Fur-
thermore, the constraints imposed by society are similar, since the individuals of the
real couples and the simulated real couples have about the same personal charac-
teristics, are all married or living together and have about the same work time overlap.
There is empirical support for market work synchronization in the Netherlands.
Although the effect is small, we find that pseudo couples have significantly less work
time overlap compared to real couples of about 5.5 min per working day. The small
effect can be partly due to fact that in this paper it is assumed that partners coor-
dinate their work schedules in order to synchronize their work hours each day.
However, it might be the case that partners synchronize their work times in a week-
dimension. It is for example possible that partners choose to work 36 h per week,
and divide these hours over 4 days instead of the usual 5. This would give them one
extra non-labor day.
In general we find that the possibility of coordination will result in more work
time overlap. It is likely that children have the effect of desynchronizing work
schedules while synchronization of work schedules may be the rule in the absence of
children.
Again notice that the assumption that partners synchronize their work times in a
day dimension can be crucial. Consider again the two partners that decide to work
four days per week instead of 5 and assume that they have a young child. What will
they do with there extra non-labor day? Do they de-synchronize that day in order to
take care of the children. Do they synchronize that work day in order to spend time
together with their child?
The empirical results show that individuals tend to coordinate their work
schedules in order to spend more time with each other, which is evidence for
togetherness preferences. If partners coordinate their work schedules and as a
consequence synchronize their work times one hour more, this will result in 0.198 h
more joint leisure time. The preference for togetherness and having children have a
opposing effect on work timing.
For further research it is interesting to relax the assumption that partners syn-
chronize their work times each day. The synchronization effect is likely to be larger
if we allow for the fact that partners might synchronize their work times each week
or even each month. Furthermore, it is important to focus more on the trade-off
between the preference for togetherness and how children affect work timing, since
this influences labor supply decisions.
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Appendix
This appendix shows that it is necessary to simulate one couple that is very similar to
the real couple from the total sample of real couples. Simulating one couple rather
similar to the real couple enables us to generate two pseudo couple outcomes and
two real couple outcomes for each household.
Consider a couple in our sample where the individuals of the couple are denoted
by Mi and Fi. Conditional on personal characteristics Mi is matched to another male
drawn from the sample M–i. Fi is matched to another female drawn from the sample
F–i. The simulated male and female are denoted by Mjs and Fks and together they are
considered to be a pseudo couple.8
To give a simple example, suppose that we condition merely on the education
level of males and females, which is measured on a 1 to 8 point scale. Suppose





Household A will now receive identification number 87 while household B and C
receive identification number 65. Therefore, based on education level household B
and C can be matched. Note that this method requires that there is be an exact
match between the two households.





The arrows indicate that there is interaction (communication or coordination)
between two individuals. If we would like to test that synchronization of leisure time
results from coordination between two individuals, at least to some extent, then
comparing the possible joint leisure time between (Mi; Fi) and (Mjs; Fks) is not
sufficient. This is shown by the following steps:9
1. There is coordination between Mi and Fi
2. There is no coordination between Mjs and Fks
3. Mjs interacts with Fj and Fks interacts with Mks.
4. Assume for simplicity that Mk = Mi.
5. Case 1: Fj has different personal characteristics than Fi
Case 2: Fj has similar personal characteristics than Fi
6. Suppose case 1 holds and a positive significant difference is observed in the
timing of work between (Mi; Fi) and (Mjs; Fks). This positive significant
difference can be caused by
8 Note that it holds for the subscript that i „ j „ k. Furthermore, s stands for simulated.
9 Note that we use = to indicate that two individuals have same personal characteristics.
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(a) Coordination between Mi and Fi
(b) Coordination between Mjs and Fj
(c) Difference personal characteristics of Fj and Fi. Due to this difference the two
couples ((Mjs;Fj) and (Mi;Fi)) are facing different constraints imposed by
society.
7. Suppose case 2 holds and a positive significant difference is observed in the
timing of work between (Mi;Fi) and (Mjs;Fks). This positive significant difference
can be caused by
(a) Coordination between Mi and Fi
(b) Coordination between Mjs and Fj
8. Empirical support for work time synchronization is then found if:
(a) Comparing timing of market work (Mi;Fi) and (Mjs;Fj) and finding no
significant difference in the timing of market work.
(b) Comparing timing of market work of, respectively, (Mi;Fi) and (Mjs;Fj) with the
possible pseudo couples, i.e. (Mi;Fj) and (Mjs;Fi). Finding that real couples time
their market work better compared to the pseudo couples, in the sense that
there is significantly more overlap.
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